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Abstract
Abating climate change is an enormous international public goods problem with
a classical free rider structure. But it is also a global free driver problem be-
cause geoengineering the stratosphere with reective particles to block incoming solar
radiation is so cheap that it could essentially be undertaken unilaterally by one state
perceiving itself to be in peril. This exploratory paper develops the main features of a
free driverexternality in a simple model motivated by the asymmetric consequences
of type-I and type-II errors. I propose a social-choice decision architecture embodying
the solution concept of a supermajority voting rule and derive its basic properties.
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JEL classi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1 Introduction via Climate Change
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the economics of climate change is the enormity of the
international public-goods problem that it presents. Overcoming the free rider problem
on a global externality of such immense scope represents a world governance challenge of
unprecedented proportions. Not infrequently, one encounters statements in the literature
such as climate change is the biggest market failure the world has ever seenor climate
change is the mother of all externalitiesor the like.
This paper begins with the realization that there are really two di¤erent externalities
involved in the climate change problem, that they have near-opposite properties, that they
interact, and that it seems di¢ cult to say o¤hand which one is more threatening than the
other. The rst externality, described by the above quotes, comes in the usual familiar
form of a public goods problem whose challenge is enormous because so much is at stake and
it is so di¢ cult to reach an international governing agreement that divides up the relatively
expensive sacrices that would be required by each nation to really make much of a dent in
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations. The classic governance problem here is to limit the
under-provision of a public good from free riding.
A second less-familiar externality shows up in the scary form of geoengineering the
stratosphere with reective particles to block incoming solar radiation. This geoengineering-
type externality is so relatively cheap to enact that it might in principle e¤ectively be under-
taken unilaterally by one nation feeling itself under climate siege, to the detriment of other
nations. The challenge with this second global externality also appears to be enormous,
because here too so much is at stake and it also seems di¢ cult to reach an international
governing agreement. If the rst externality founders on the free riderproblem of under-
provision, then the second externality founders on what might be called the free driver
problem of over-provision. If the rst externality is the mother of all externalities,then
the second externality might be called the father of all externalities. These two powerful
externalities appear to be almost polar opposites, with the world forced to confront both.
This paper concentrates on the second or free-driver externality. The next section
describes in an extremely compressed form some of the most salient features of geoengineering
that are relevant for motivating the abstract model of this paper. Among the questions
needing to be addressed are the following. Who is allowed to do geoengineering? Under
what circumstances? What is the relevant solution concept? Is there any recognizable
decision mechanism, however hypothetical, abstract, and seemingly unrealistic, that theory
suggests? And might this theory actually form the backbone of a governance architecture?
The paper treats geoengineering as one particular motivating example from a more gen-
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eral family of public-good-like externalities, whose generic properties are the main subject
of investigation. This abstraction of geoengineering is called a free driverexternality for
reasons that will become apparent. Governance is the key issue for a free-driver externality.
For example, geoengineering without a proper governance architecture could become a ma-
jor global threat with the potential to cause serious international frictions and even outright
conicts. Designing a social-choice architecture to deal with this free-driver governance
dilemma is the central theme of the paper. Alas, while the problem is important, it is also
di¢ cult to model. I am forced to beg the readers indulgence for an analysis that is only
partial (and therefore criticizable) in favor of providing some new insights on an important
subject.
I present the simplest formal analytical representation of a free-driver externality that I
can imagine. The model is based on a very crude analogy to the asymmetric consequences
of type-I and type-II errors as manifested in a kinked loss function with di¤erent right-side
and left-side slopes. The socially optimal solution is derived. I attempt constructively
to sketch the theoretical outlines of a possible governance architecture for dealing with a
free-driver externality. The point of departure is the insight that a free-driver externality
does not confront the thorny issue of assigning compliance costs, which hobbles resolution of
a free-rider externality. I show that a free-driver externality may perhaps be more amenable
to a reasonable resolution than a free-rider externality because some of its worst features
might be ameliorated by a relatively simple voting mechanism that does not involve transfer
payments.
In this paper I propose a social-choice decision architecture based on a supermajority1
voting rule for the free-driver problem and I examine its basic properties. In the model
this supermajority voting rule attains the socially optimal cooperative solution, which is a
new theoretical result around which the paper is built. To be sure, this proposed solution
concept is presented and analyzed here only under very strong assumptions and at such
a high level of abstraction that it might seem remote from geoengineering. The paper is
frankly exploratory and intended to be thought provoking. Nevertheless, my hope is that
the derived supermajority voting rule might serve as a template for a future governance
architecture that is at least worth thinking about and discussing.
1In the name of convenience I abuse terminology throughout this paper because the supermajority
rule is not applied symmetrically, but refers to one direction only (typically upward changes whereas
downward changesare made by minority rule).
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2 Geoengineering as a Free-Driver Externality
I now want to describe very briey some aspects of the spectre of geoengineering that are
relevant to this paper.2 Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the world is unable to rise
to the free-rider global public-good challenge represented by excessive GHG emissions and
that we continue more or less along the same lines of business as usual. Suppose, further
for the sake of argument, that some kind of a tipping event like massive methane or carbon
dioxide releases with strong bad feedbacks begins in earnest a half-century or so from now.
In this low-probability science ction story we might then become very scared that we were
riding along a trajectory leading to a climate disaster. A high-temperature trajectory might
be accompanied by the threat of a rapid rise of sea level, altered oceanic and atmospheric
circulation patterns, harmful regional weather changes, and so forth. There could well be
other nasty tipping-point surprises, some of which are unknown unknowns in the form
of events that we cannot now even imagine. What might we then do? In the face of
rapidly rising temperatures some might be tempted to try to deliberately geoengineer the
planet as a quick x, which would be su¢ cient to restore temperatures to safer levels at least
temporarily while we try, this time hopefully seriously, to cut back drastically on greenhouse
gas emissions and to undertake other, more permanent if much more slower-acting, measures.
A U.S. National Academy of Sciences (2010) study dened geoengineering as options
that would involve large-scale engineering of our environment in order to combat or coun-
teract the e¤ects of changes in atmospheric chemistry.Similarly, a study of the U.K. Royal
Society (2009) dened geoengineering as the deliberate large-scale manipulation of the plan-
etary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate change.There are several possible
forms of geoengineering. But as of now it seems that there is only one type that would
o¤er a quick x to the problem of increasing temperatures. This form of geoengineering
would create an articial sunshade by injecting reective particles into the stratosphere that
block out a small but signicant fraction of about a percent or so of incoming solar radia-
tion. Henceforth in this paper I abuse terminology by identifying the term geoengineering
specically with providing an articial sunshade, which more technically is sometimes called
solar radiation management(SRM).3
2There is a sizable literature on this subject, which is readily available on the internet by searching the
word geoengineering. In particular, Wikipedia provides a decent summary of the main issues with an
extensive bibliography for further reference. See also U.K. Royal Society (2009), U.S. Academy of Sciences
(2010), and Bipartisan Policy Center (2011). While emphasizing his own viewpoint, the recent book by
David Keith (2013) covers much of the latest thinking on geoengineering.
3Other examples of geoengineering might include ocean fertilization, direct removal of atmospheric CO2,
creating low-level clouds from ocean spray, and so forth. Injecting reective particles into the stratosphere
is only one form of SRM, but here I blur this distinction.
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The planet itself naturally geoengineers a temporary sunshade when there is an explosive
volcanic eruption involving sulfur dioxide (SO2). The resulting aerosol particles that coalesce
around SO2 in the stratosphere reect back incoming sunlight, thereby lowering the Earths
surface temperatures almost immediately. The last time this naturally occurring phenom-
enon transpired was during the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in 1991, which was estimated
to have lowered the average surface temperature of the earth by about 0.5C during the
subsequent year or two, returning to its baseline temperature shortly thereafter.
For better or for worse, discussion about researching a geoengineered sunshade has grown
enormously in the past ve years or so. It is an extraordinarily controversial idea. A geo-
engineered sunshade of particles placed in the stratosphere introduces immense di¢ culties,
dangers, uncertainties, and dilemmas of its own making. Almost no serious observer is
advocating a geoengineered sunshade as a rst line of defense against climate change. But it
might have an important niche role as an emergency fallback component in a complete port-
folio of options to deal with global warming. This might prove to be signicant if very little
is done about averting climate change by way of curtailing GHG emissions until noticeably
disastrous e¤ects are rst bearing down upon us seriously.
A geoengineered sunshade is now the only known measure that can lower worldwide sur-
face temperatures immediately, and therefore it represents as of now the only human response
that might quickly ward o¤ catastrophic impacts of accelerating-temperature trajectories.
By comparison, carbon dioxide emissions reductions are extremely slow acting on climate
change due to very long inertial lags. Even if it could be so ordained instantaneously, a
complete cessation of CO2 emissions would be unlikely to fend o¤many catastrophes by the
time that they appeared.4 Given the magnitude of the global public goods problem involved,
many observers reluctantly consider it unlikely that signicant worldwide GHG reductions
will begin in earnest until and unless the threat of dangerous climate change is perceived
as being tangible and imminent at the grassroots level. If this is an accurate appraisal,
catastrophic climate outcomes have a built-in endogenous component and it becomes less a
question of whether or not they will occur than when they will occur.
The setting for this papers problem of geoengineering is a future world that has accu-
4Solomon et al (2009) calculated how concentrations of CO2 would be expected to fall o¤ over time if all
anthropogenic emissions were to cease immediately, following a future 2% annual growth rate of emissions up
to peak concentrations of 450, 550, 650, 750, 850 and 1,200 ppm. As the authors state: The example of a
sudden cessation of emissions provides an upper bound to how much reversibility is possible, if, for example,
unexpectedly damaging climate changes were to be observed. Results di¤ered for di¤erent trajectories and
scenarios, but a crude rule of thumb seemed to be that approximately 70% of the peak enhancement level
over the preindustrial level of 280 ppm persevered after 100 years of zero emissions, while approximately
40% of the peak enhancement level over the preindustrial level of 280 ppm persevered after 1,000 years of
zero emissions.
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mulated high enough GHG concentrations for a long enough time that some countries are
feeling under severe threat from climate changes. Perhaps Bangladesh is threatened by in-
undation from melting ice sheets. Or maybe Indian agriculture is starting to wilt from high
temperatures and monsoon alterations. Or other countries like China are beginning to be
concerned with damaging climate change for other reasons. Suppose that the governments
of one or more such concerned countries feel themselves under such intense domestic political
pressure that they cannot wait for gradual diminishment of GHG emissions, but must come
out in favor of geoengineering lower temperatures immediately (at very little cost to them).
Suppose that much of the rest of the world fears geoengineering and opposes anyone doing
it. What is the outcome?
A geoengineered sunshade has a long list of things going against it. It is scary and
potentially dangerous. Some of the negatives include continued ocean acidication, depletion
of stratospheric ozone, dependency e¤ects, changed regional weather patterns, a possible
weakening of resolve to cut GHG emissions, and so forth. My purpose here is not to discuss
in detail the pros or cons of an engineered sunshade approach to the climate change problem.
I merely want to convey the most rudimentary knowledge of the basic underlying idea for
the primary purpose of motivating the model of this paper.
The economics of geoengineering have been called incredible.5 It appears that the
direct costs of putting up a geoengineered particulate sunshade by modied high-altitude
airplanes or balloon-tethered hoses or other means are extraordinarily cheap relative to
the costs of mitigating GHG emissions.6 Essentially any determined country with even a
medium-sized economy could, if unopposed, put up a geoengineered sunshade on its own, in
answer to its own perceived need to lower global temperatures and change its own climate
quickly.
This is a true twin externalityto the conventional externality of emitting greenhouse
gases. The conventional CO2 emissions externality is sometimes called colorfully the mother
of all externalitiesbecause curtailing GHGs is su¢ ciently expensive that it is di¢ cult to
attain meaningful global agreement on apportioning compliance costs. But then a geoengi-
neered sunshade might be called (also colorfully) the father of all externalities because
knocking down global average temperatures is so cheap that in principle one country could
5The term is due to Scott Barrett (2008), who drew attention to this aspect. See also the more recent
papers of Klepper and Rickels (2012) and Goes, Keller and Turano (2011). These papers contain a more
detailed description of the economics of geoengineering than this paper, along with references. Thomas
Schelling (1996) should be credited with rst articulating the idea that the low cost of geoengineering turns
the climate-change externality problem on its head.
6Ballpark estimates of annual geoengineering costs of o¤setting projected heating in this century might be
in the neighborhood of around eight billion dollars or so per year (McClellan, Keith, and Apt (2012)). The
leading technology being discussed is a eet of high-altitude airplanes specially modied to emit sulfates.
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do it unilaterally to t its own particular perceived needs, thereby imposing a dangerous
public badon a multitude of other nations. So the world faces not one, but two global
externalities from climate change.
The rst, conventional, externality of curtailing GHGs is already familiar as a global
public goods issue having a serious free-rider problem. The second, geoengineered-sunshade-
type externality, is less familiar. I next move towards addressing this free driverexternality
in a formal model. At the center of this formal model will be a loose generalization of the
idea of type-I and type-II errors, as extended to a continuum of possible choices. The next
section is intended to motivate this generalization by rst discussing errors of type I and
type II in a simpler and more standard discrete binary setting.
3 Background: Errors of Type I and Type II
This section is frankly metaphorical and suggestive. The purpose is to motivate envisioning
geoengineering as involving two types of risks the risk of overdoing it (here analogous to a
type-I error), and the risk of underdoing it (here analogous to a type-II error). In the paper,
these two errors or mistakes will have asymmetric expected losses as in a two-part tari¤ or
a kinked loss function.
This section exposits the simplest zero-one binary choice model in a decision-theoretic
context with di¤erent penalties for type-I and type-II mistakes. I give two examples. The
rst involves a familiar aspect of the criminal justice system and is used primarily as a
conceptual device to motivate further applications. The second example involves a simple
discrete-choice version of a geoengineering decision, which will serve as a more direct moti-
vation for the more general continuous version of a free-driver externality that constitutes
the core model of this paper. The aim here is to convey the loose imagery of a familiar
analogy, absent any pretense that this motivating metaphor provides a rigorous foundation
for the general model.
A type-I error is the rejection of a null hypothesis that is actually true. It is a false posi-
tive. By contrast, a type-II error is the acceptance of a null hypothesis that is actually false,
or a false negative. These two types of mistakes may have very di¤erent risk consequences
with very di¤erent penalty losses. The goal, which will later be made more explicit, is to
minimize some risk-weighted sum of the two types of losses.
Consider rst a binary choice example from the legal system. Let the null hypothesis
be that the accused is innocent. Let x be a binary variable reecting the judgment of a
hypothetical outside social observer representing the justice system as a whole. If x=0,
the outside observer believes that the accused is innocent. If x=1, this outside observer
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believes that the accused is guilty.
Let y be a binary variable representing the actual verdict. If y=0, the accused is found
not guilty and is acquitted. If y=1, the accused is found guilty and receives a severe
punishment.
A type-I error occurs when x=0 and y=1. To the hypothetical outside observer repre-
senting the justice system as a whole, an innocent person has wrongfully been found guilty.
Suppose the outside observer attaches a social-penalty loss of I to this false-positive out-
come.
A type-II error occurs when x=1 and y=0. To the outside observer representing the
justice system as a whole, a guilty person has erroneously been acquitted. Suppose the
outside observer attaches a social-penalty loss of II to this false-negative outcome.
Throughout this paper it is more convenient to think in terms of relative penalty losses,
which are normalized so that
  I
I + II
(1)
is the relative penalty weight attributed to an error of type I, while 1    is the relative
penalty weight attributed to an error of type II. These two types of errors are unlikely to
be equally costly. In the justice example a type-II error is like a disturbing error of omission,
whereas a type-I error is more like a horrifying error of commission. Therefore, in this
example,  is large while 1   is small.
In some sense yet to be made precise, the social observer wishes to design an optimal
voting-like decision mechanism for a hypothetical jury that reects the relative weights of
the two penalty losses for errors of type I and type II.
The second example concerns a vastly oversimplied and highly abstract formulation of
geoengineering as a binary choice problem. This discrete example will serve as a transition
bridge to the more general continuous version of the free-driver problem, which is the main
subject of the paper.
The null hypothesis here is that geoengineering is undesirable. Let x be a binary variable
reecting the opinion of an interested party about whether or not geoengineering should be
undertaken. If x=0, the interested party believes that geoengineering is harmful to them
and should not be undertaken. If x=1, the interested party believes that geoengineering is
benecial for them and should be undertaken.
Let y be a binary variable representing the actual outcome of geoengineering. If y=0,
geoengineering is not undertaken. If y=1, geoengineering is undertaken.
A type-I loss occurs when x=0 and y=1. In this case geoengineering is undertaken
despite the fact that it harms the interested party. From the point of view of the interested
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party, geoengineering is overdone here, resulting in a type I error. Suppose that in this
situation the relative social loss is .
A type-II loss occurs when x=1 and y=0. In this case geoengineering is not undertaken
despite the fact that it benets the interested party. From the point of view of the interested
party, geoengineering is underdone here, resulting in a type II error. In this situation the
relative social loss is 1  .
As with the justice example, it seems reasonable to suppose that a type-II loss (geoengi-
neering is underdone) might be disturbing to the interested party because their welfare is
sub-optimal, whereas a type-I loss (geoengineering is overdone) might be horrifying to the
interested party because it represents a relatively much riskier strategy with a relatively
much more heavily weighted downside. Therefore, in this binary geoengineering example,
 is relatively large while 1   is relatively small.
In a sense that is about to be made precise within a more general setting, the social
planner wishes to design a constitution for an optimal voting-like decision mechanism that
reects the relative riskiness-weights of the two penalty losses. It is to this more general
formulation that we now turn.
4 The Pure Theory of a Free-Driver Externality
Geoengineering represents a kind of perverse public good having some distinctive properties.
I feel that the role of the geoengineering externality will be better appreciated when it is rst
studied in its abstract pure form as a particular example belonging to the public-good-like
family, but having special features whose generic properties warrant attention in their own
right.
A pure public good is typically dened as a commodity that is both non-excludable (no
one can be excluded from consuming it) and non-diminishable (one persons consumption
does not alter the amount available to others). A public good is standardly considered
to be good, meaning that almost everyone thinks more of it is better, at least throughout
the domain having policy relevance. Usual examples are police and re protection, national
defense, weather predictions, and the like.
A pure public bad is typically dened as a commodity that is both non-exemptable (no
one can be exempted from consuming it) and non-diminishable (one persons consumption
does not diminish the amount that others must consume). A public bad is standardly
considered to be bad, meaning that almost everyone thinks more of it is worse, at least
throughout the domain having policy relevance. A standard example of a public bad is
pollution.
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Because it is costly to increase the level of a public good or to decrease the level of a
public bad, such situations are plagued by the free-rider problem. Instead of paying their
fair share, everyone wants to free ride o¤ the payments of everyone else. The problem of a
geoengineering externality has a di¤erent structure.
I now want to introduce the idea of a gob.7 A gobis a commodity that may be good or
bad depending on who is consuming it and how much they are consuming. A pure public gob
is a pure public good (more of it is better) for some people under some circumstances and a
pure public bad (more of it is worse) for some other people under some other circumstances.
Throughout this paper, the primary example of a pure public gob is geoengineering in a
future world su¢ ciently impaired by climate change that some countries would want to do
some of it on their own if allowed to act unilaterally. The key issue is that parties di¤er in
their attitudes toward whether more or less gob is desirable and some mechanism is required
to reconcile these di¤erences.
A free-driver externality is a pure public gob whose production happens to be free (or,
in practice, is su¢ ciently inexpensive to be considered free). In this paper the inspiration
for, and primary application of, a free-driver externalityis geoengineering the stratosphere
with reective particles to reect back incoming solar radiation. This would be so relatively
cheap that many nations could a¤ord to do it unilaterally.
The key abstraction about being freein a free-driver externalityis that, absent the
rules of some overarching governance structure, each agent is in principle free to choose
(at zero cost to itself) the gob level that will be imposed on itself and all of the other
agents. Depending on the nature of the gob and its reversibility by other agents, this
leads either to anarchy with an undened outcome (for free reversibility by other agents)
or to an extreme outcome dominated by the agent with the most extreme preferences (for
complete irreversibility by other agents). I assume that the latter situation is relevant for
geoengineering because it is di¢ cult to do counter-geoengineering.
The theoretical core of this paper characterizes the socially optimal level of gob produc-
tion in an abstract setting and shows that (under a particular piecewise-linear specication)
it can be implemented by a relatively simple supermajority-type voting rule. It is possible
to pose the free-driver externality problem in somewhat more general form than I do here,
but only at the expense of dulling a sharp simple result. In this paper I aim for sharpness
and simplicity. Therefore, in what follows, I abstract heroically to put it mildly. At the
very least, the crisp formulation of this paper can serve as a benchmark point of departure
7I think it is somewhat clearer for a reader if I use fresh terminology rather than attempting to shoehorn
this problem into the already existing terminology of public goods when this problem is not a fully comfortable
t with the existing terminology.
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for more complicated and fuller analyses.
Let there be n nationsindexed by i = 1; 2; :::; n. There are mi citizens of nation i
and a total of m citizens of the world,where
m =
nX
i=1
mi: (2)
The citizens of each nation have identical preferences with each other but (possibly)
di¤erent preferences from the citizens of other nations. In this metaphor each citizen will
have one vote and it will not matter whether citizens of nation i vote individually or as a
bloc with mi votes. At the highest level of abstraction, the fmig are given equity-welfare
voting weights that have already been assigned on the basis of some or another criterion.
Suppose that a citizen of nation i prefers the gob level xi  0 to any other level. In
the case of geoengineering, this preference is essentially for a level of geoengineering (as
measured, say, by sulfate levels) that best o¤sets the deleterious e¤ects of climate change
being experienced by nation i. Without loss of generality, nations are arranged in ascending
order of gob preference so that
i < j =) xi  xj: (3)
Let y  0 be the actual level of worldwide gob production. Let Li(y) be the loss
function for a citizen of nation i. This paper considers a very simple loss function, which
embodies the concept of constant per-unit penalties for type-I and type-II mistakes. When
y  xi, the citizens of nation i su¤er what to them is a type-I error of magnitude y   xi
(geoengineering is overdone). When y < xi, the citizens of nation i su¤er what for them is
a type-II error of magnitude xi   y (geoengineering is underdone).
All citizens of all nations have the same per-unit penalty of  for a type-I error, and the
same per-unit penalty of 1   for a type-II error. Therefore,
y  xi =) Li(y) = (y   xi); (4)
and
y < xi =) Li(y) = (1  )(xi   y): (5)
The loss function (4), (5) is of a simple piecewise-linear form with a single kink at xi.
In this sense, xi acts as a kind of reference point for nation i. The upward per-unit loss
aversion is  for an error of type I, while the downward per-unit loss aversion for an error of
type II is 1 . Citizens di¤er only by their preferred reference level of the geoengineering
gob, with the per-unit loss aversion for overdoing geoengineering being identically  for an
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error of type I and the per-unit loss aversion for underdoing geoengineering being identically
1    for an error of type II. This is a very strong assumption. For sure, the crisp voting
result of the paper depends on this simple kinked penalty function with the same slopes for
everyone, where the only di¤erence is the location of the kink. I cannot provide a strong
foundation for this assumption, but must instead rely on heuristics and the fact that it gives
a sharp result which might serve as a point of departure for further discussion.
Without loss of generality it is assumed that  > 1=2. (The case  < 1=2 involves a
symmetric treatment, while the case  = 1=2 is familiar from median-voter theory.) Thus,
in what follows a gob level above the desired reference level involves a type-I penalty that is
greater than the type-II penalty for a gob level equally far below the desired reference level.
In the situation of geoengineering,  might well be deemed to be larger than 1   because
overdone geoengineering involves risks that are potentially more dangerous than underdone
geoengineering (although this logic could be reversed for some scenarios).
If states are sovereign and do not have binding treaty obligations they can, at least in
principle, act unilaterally in their own self interest by choosing their own favorite amount of
reective particles to place in the stratosphere. (This is an abstraction of a more complicated
situation where states have some responsibility not to harm other states, are not giving
or receiving behavior-altering side payments, and so forth.) The non-cooperative Nash-
equilibrium outcome ey is then the maximum of the preferred geoengineering-gob level among
all nations. By (3), the nation who favors the most gob is nation n. Therefore
ey = xn = max
1in
fxig: (6)
The nation n, which favors the most gob, is called the dominant free driver.
Even without yet dening formally the socially optimal gob level, what leaps out of (6)
is the strong degree of non-optimality of ey. In the Nash equilibrium, free-driven gob is
oversupplied because only the dominant driver is fully satised with the outcome everyone
else wants less gob but is forced to accept a large per-unit type-I loss of . In this setup
there are not just winners and losers. Only the dominant free driver is a winner everyone
else is a loser relative to their preferred gob level because they are exposed to the excessive
risk of a type-I error.8
Of course, this model is just a particularly heroic abstraction of a much more complicated
situation. Even so, the message would appear to be that geoengineering looks like a
dangerous global externality accident waiting to happen, which has the potential to cause
8This does not exclude the possibility that society might be better o¤ at the extreme point y = xn than
at the extreme point y = 0.
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serious international frictions and even outright conicts if it is left to simmer away on
its own. Overall, the externality-governance issues raised by geoengineering look severe
enough to warrant being addressed by the international community long before the problem
might actually raise its ugly head.
What is the socially-optimal level of geoengineering gob? To answer this question re-
quires a bit more notation.
For any nonnegative gob level y, let F (y) be the cumulative distribution function, meaning
the fraction of the population whose preferred gob level is less than or equal to y. Thus,
xi  y < xi+1 =) F (y) = 1
m
iX
j=1
mj: (7)
The worldwide social loss function L(y) is postulated to be the utilitarian sum of each
citizens loss function. From (4), (5) this means that
L(y) = 
Z y
0
(y   x) dF (x) + (1  )
Z 1
y
(x  y) dF (x); (8)
where the integration in (8) refers to a Riemann-Stieltjes integral that accommodates F (x)
being a step function.
A -optimal gob level y satises
L(y) = min
0y<1
fL(y)g; (9)
where existence of such a minimizing y is guaranteed because L(y) is continuous in y  0
and L(1) =1.
The next task is to show that a socially optimal gob level y is supported as a superma-
jority voting equilibrium and vice versa.
Much of the paper to this point has been devoted to justifying (8) with a story exposited
in terms of geoengineering gob. An alternative route would have been to begin with (8)
as a social loss function, leaving its justication in the background since (8) might apply
for many situations (with or without free driving). This alternative route might focus
an even sharper spotlight on the key analytical result of the paper, which is to show that
there is a tight duality connection between optimized social welfare (9) (when expressed
by the particular loss function (8)) and a simple supermajoritarian voting implementation
mechanism. In other words, the pure theory has a stand-alone quality that does not require
the motivational example of free-driving geoengineering, although, in my opinion, it greatly
enhances the telling of the story.
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5 The Socially-Optimal Gob as a Voting Equilibrium
We seek a robust governance architecture with goodproperties that can react automat-
ically to balance ever-changing opinions and attitudes about individually-desired levels of
geoengineering gob fxig. In other words, the individual fxig might change over time
depending upon circumstances, but the ideal governance constitution should automatically
select the gob level y that is optimal for these changed values of fxig.
Consider any two levels of gob y0 and y00. Suppose y0 < y00. Consider the following
asymmetric pairwise -voting rule. To raise the level of geoengineering gob from y0 to y00
requires the approval of at least the fraction  of voters, in which case we write y00 % y0:
In the other direction, to lower the level of geoengineering gob from y00 to y0 requires the
approval of at least the fraction 1   of voters, in which case we write y0 % y00.
A -voting equilibrium is a value by that defeats (or at least ties) every other possible
candidate in a -voting binary comparison i.e., for all y  0 it holds that
by % y: (10)
In this setup with type-I and type-II errors, what is the relationship between a voting
equilibrium and a social optimum? The following proposition is a generalization of the
median-voter theorem. (The median-voter theorem corresponds to the special case  =
 = 1=2.) The result presented in the following theorem is new and constitutes the main
theoretical contribution of this paper.9
Theorem 1 The gob level y is -optimal if and only if y is a -voting equilibrium.
Proof. Di¤erentiating (8) from the right, the right hand side derivative of L(y) is
dL
dy+
= 
Z y+
0
dF (x)  (1  )
Z 1
y+
dF (x) = F (y) +   1: (11)
For all y>0, dene
F (y)  lim
!0+
F (y   ); (12)
9For the technically minded reader, the model is a special variant of choosing a one-dimensional public
outcome when preferences are single peaked. The voting mechanism I recommend is one of the classic
positional dictatormechanisms (Moulin (1991), section 10.2). Such mechanisms have the good properties
of group-strategy-proofness, e¢ ciency, and fairness. My special contribution is to motivate and study a
special asymmetric pair of marginal disutilities as one moves away from the peak in each direction. (The
symmetric case is standard and associated with median-voter theory.) Extending the argument for a well-
known result from the median voter  = 1=2 literature (see, e.g., Easley and Kleinberg (2010), section 23.6)
to the case  6= 1=2 can be used to prove that a -voting rule applied to all pairs of alternatives produces a
group voting-preference relation that is complete and transitive.
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and dene F (0) = 0.
Di¤erentiating (8) from the left when y > 0, the left hand side derivative of L(y) is
dL
dy  = 
Z y 
0
dF (x)  (1  )
Z 1
y 
dF (x) = F (y) +   1: (13)
Both F (y) and F (y) are monotone non-decreasing in y with F (y)  F (y), signifying
from (11) and (13) that the function L(y) is convex. The necessary and su¢ cient condition
for L(y) to be minimized is therefore
0  dL
dy+
(14)
for y = 0, and
dL
dy   0 
dL
dy+
(15)
for y > 0.
Combining (11) and (13) with (14) and (15), gob level y minimizes L(y) if and only if
it satises the condition
F (y)  1    F (y): (16)
We next show that (16) implies that y is a -voting equilibrium.
Pick any y00 > y. Then at least the fraction F (y) of voters are closer to y than to
y00, and therefore prefer y to y00. Equivalently, no more than the fraction 1 F (y) prefers
y00 to y. But from (16), 1  F (y)  , which then means that no more than the fraction 
of voters prefers y00 to y. This implies, by the -voting rule, that y % y00.
Pick any y0 < y (if y > 0). Then at least the fraction 1 F (y) of voters are closer
to y than to y0, and therefore prefer y to y0. Equivalently, no more than the fraction
F (y) prefers y0 to y. But from (16), F (y)  1   , which then means that no more
than the fraction 1    of voters prefers y0 to y. This implies, by the -voting rule, that
y % y0.
To show that y being a -voting equilibrium implies (16), we employ a local small-
perturbation argument. Let  = 0+ be an arbitrarily small positive number.
The fraction of voters who prefer y +  to y is 1   F (y). But y % y +  implies
by the -voting rule that no more than the fraction  of voters prefers y +  to y. Thus,
1 F (y)  . In the other direction, if y > 0 then the fraction of voters who prefer y  
to y is F (y). But y % y  implies by the -voting rule that no more than the fraction
1  of voters prefers y   to y. Thus, F (y)  1 . Combining these two conditions
yields (16).
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The -voting rule corresponds to a form of supermajoritarianism that already exists and
is familiar for special situations throughout the real world. One might then invert Theorem
1 to ask the following question. Given some value of , for what class of preferences is the
-voting rule socially optimal? Theorem 1 states that the -voting rule is socially optimal
for preferences that are as if given by (4), (5) with  = . To go beyond this as if
characterization to a more general description of preferences for which the -voting rule is
socially optimal is an interesting subject of future research that would take this paper too far
aeld. Here I can only hope that Theorem 1 gives some broad insights as an approximation
that extends beyond its restrictive preference structure. What is remarkable here, I think,
is not that Theorem 1 is restrictive and criticizable, but that one can obtain such a social-
optimality result at all from a -voting rule. I view Theorem 1 as a point of departure for
further discussion, not the nal word on a very complicated subject.
6 A Naive Geoengineering-Governance Proposal
The idea of geoengineering is not about to go away any time soon. If anything, interest
in solar radiation management is likely to grow over time. Geoengineering is simply too
cheap and too tempting for it to recede politely from public view. My basic premise is that
we must do some serious thinking about the architecture of a geoengineering governance
structure sooner, rather than later.
What are we to make of Theorem 1? Can it be taken seriously? I guess the answer
depends, at least in part, on the alternatives. An old adage has it that you cant beat
something with nothing. Suppose we allow a willing suspension of disbelief. In the spirit
of putting something constructive on the discussion table, I propose the following idea.
Yes, we need advisory commissions with public participation for the governance of geo-
engineering. And yes, we need to balance standards of oversight with international political
reality and with principles of transparency and accountability. But at the end of the day
this is all too vague. At the end of the day we need to have some concrete governance struc-
ture with specic rules concerning how to make nal decisions about geoengineering levels
that di¤erentially impact parties having di¤erent interests. Otherwise, with a free-driver
externality, we risk paralysis and conict.
For the sake of specicity, I somewhat arbitrarily propose that a type-I error of overdone
geoengineering be given a relative penalty weight three times that for a type-II error of
underdone geoengineering. In the notation of this paper, I am setting  = 3=4. This value
corresponds to a voting system that requires a 3/4 majority. (A more cautious person who
puts a heavier weight on a type-I error of over-geoengineering relative to a type-II error of
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under-geoengineering might prefer a value of  = 4=5, say, while a less cautious person might
prefer  = 2=3, say.10)
A permanent international governance structure for geoengineering is established, at
the core of which is a body acting like a legislative general assembly. Each country has
a metaphorical representation in the general assembly, with voting weight proportional to
its population, say. Any proposal to increase the level of geoengineering requires at least
a 3/4 supermajority of the general assembly. Any proposal to decrease the level of geo-
engineering requires at least a 1/4 superminorityof the general assembly. An executive
arm is empowered to carry out decisions of the general assembly and to assess penalties for
noncompliance. A judicial arm adjudicates conicts.
Is this proposal naive? Almost surely yes. To begin with, there are very few precedents
of international voting outcomes applying with binding force. More generally, I am simplis-
tically brushing aside a great many truly important aspects of the real world of international
agreements.
There is already a sizable literature concerning the nuances and di¢ culties of geoengi-
neering governance written by distinguished experts on international law and politics.11 The
tone of this literature is grounded in the realities of global politics and is largely pessimistic
about the prospects for workable geoengineering governance. This paper has somewhat
di¤erent aims, being more theory-based, more speculative, more heroic, and more naive.
The proposal of this section is being mooted not so much as a reality-encapsulated opera-
tional plan, but more in the spirit of a theory-based point of departure for further discussion.
Maybe the world is not yet ready for such a heroic international voting governance structure.
On the other hand, maybe we need to start thinking along such radical lines and the threat
of geoengineering provides the impetus to try.
Why would countries voluntarily accede to a voting limitation on their sovereignty? That
is, why would a country agree in the rst stage to participate in such a second-stage voting
architecture? I do not have a good answer to this question except to ask another question.
What are the alternatives for geoengineering governance and on what alternative theory are
they based? The paper blindly assumes that the geoengineering free-driver problem is su¢ -
ciently threatening to encourage rst-stage participation and concentrates on examining the
second-stage voting consequences. There is a tension here, which I am unable to resolve,
10Ideally, the appropriate value of  is thrashed out at some kind of constitutional convention of the
parties that occurs during a prequel when some veil of ignorancemight apply and well before free-driver
geoengineering becomes an actual threat. This is yet another real-world detail that I am putting aside in
favor of focusing on the big picture.
11See, e.g., Parson and Ernst (2012), Bodansky (2011), Victor (2008), Horton (2011) and the many
references cited therein.
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between presenting a specic constructive voting proposal for addressing an important ex-
ternality problem and being an easy target for criticism on the grounds that participation is
impractical.
What comes out of this model, I think, is a loose sense that the free-driver problem of
geoengineering may be ever-so-slightly easier to resolve by a voting architecture than the
free-rider problem of GHG abatement. In the latter problem, the participants have rst
to agree on the fraction of abatement that each will bear before ever getting to second-
stage voting on the level of overall abatement. This rst-stage complication is absent from
a free-driver problem like geoengineering because participants need not negotiate what is
e¤ectively a payment-transfer agreement. Intuitively, it may be relatively easier (although
undoubtedly still very di¢ cult) to reach agreement on a voting architecture when the parties
do not have to rst argue about who pays what. Admittedly this argument is informal, but
I think it carries some weight.
7 Concluding Comments
At the beginning of this paper I posed the basic question of whether or not there exists a
solution-theoretic concept, however hypothetical and abstract, that might form the backbone
of a governance architecture for a free-driver externality. I think that Theorem 1 is giving
an a¢ rmative answer to this question in the form of a supermajority voting rule. But of
course readers are free to form their own opinions and to have their own answers. It is
true that a number of very strong assumptions have been made to obtain the basic result.
The model is subject to all of the many caveats that apply to the median voter theorem
(which is a special case of Theorem 1 corresponding to  =  = 1=2). That is on the one
hand. On the other hand, the conclusion of Theorem 1 is quite striking. There is not
really a comparable voting-optimality result available for a free-rider externality because the
problem of apportioning compliance costs adds an extra dimension of strategic complexity.12
In this sense I think that a free-driver externality may be more solvablethan a free-rider
externality. Even though it may not be easy to apply the principle of Theorem 1 in practice,
at least there exists such a principle.
The assumptions behind Theorem 1 are very restrictive. Preferences take the specic
form of a piecewise-linear loss function with everyone having the same relative-penalty slopes
for errors of type I and type II. As usual, however, the restrictiveness of the assumptions
12But see Bergstrom (1979) for discussion of some special cases of apportioning costs in a majority voting
context. Ricke, Moreno-Cruz, and Caldera (2013) investigate strategic coalition formation in a geoengineer-
ing climate game that is di¤erent from the setup of this paper.
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behind the model must be weighed against the power of the results coming out of the model.
Here a relatively simple supermajoritarian rule overcomes the free-driver externality to obtain
the socially optimal solution. Readers must judge for themselves the relevance of conclusions
based upon this model in a domain where strong results are scarce. Unsurprisingly, my own
conclusion would be that Theorem 1 may serve as a useful starting point for concentrating
the mind on a serious discussion of a decent architecture for the governance of geoengineering.
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